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because -within the confines of the model -formalist analysis provides a high degree of certitude, many economists find formalism comforting. That it sharply differentiates the professimal economist's product from cocktail-party chatter is also satisfying. In addition, it allowed the young, who generally had better mathematical training than their elders, to achieve dominance.
But although the formalist revolution succeeded in establishing rules that economist.^ must adhere to if they want to publish on mainstream topics in the "respectable" journals, it did not capture the hearts and minds of all economists. It is not certain even that it commands the a.dherence of half of all the academic economists, and it is li.kely th.at outside of academia only a distinct minority of economists accept it. But the tone of economics is set by thos:e who publish in the leading journals and teach in the major resea.rch. universities. There it dominates.
But by now counter-revolutionaries are active. Peter Boettke is one of them. Being a counter-revolutionary myself I applaud his attack on formalism, though. defining it in a narrower way than Boettke does. (see Mayer, 1993 Mayer, , 1995 . But counterrevolutionaries, like other revolutionaries, are a quarrelsome lot, so I will criticize some aspects of Boettke's critique of what he calls formalism, arid not discuss the many points on which I can only say "right on." In summary, I criticize Boettke mainly for confounding formalism with broader mainstream economics, and with thus posing a false dichotomy between formalist and Austrian economists, for going too far in his criticism of formalism, as well as for overstating the contribution of Austrian economics.
But before coming to these criticisms one should note two of the strong points of his essay. One is his distinction between the idealizations used in economic theory, and the criteria that should be used to judge the functioning of an economic system, a point discussed below. Emot.ner is his insistence that when discussing broad issues of econ.omic policy, we have to look beyond what economic theory can. tell us. Institutions do matter.
Since Boettke gives a prominent role to Abba Lerner as a formalist and proponent of market socialism, who gets it wrong because he ignores institutions, it may be appropriate to digress with a story Lerner once tc'ld. He said (private conversation) that after he wrote the Ecc~nomics of Control, he believed that he had shown that it does not matter rriuch whether a country is capitalist or socialist, as long as its managers follow the correct optimization rules he had set out. But, he added that he preferred socialism beca.use (if I remember correctly) of its more equal distribution of income. However, subsequently he changed his mind -because of fa.lse teeth. On a visit to Israel he noticed that it did a thriving export business in false teeth. This, said Lerner, was l.ogica1 because making false teeth is a business that requires much skilled labor and little capital.
But, Lerner added, no government planning agency charged to increase exports would ever think of false teeth. Since Boettke stresses the importance of innovation under capitalism, there is therefore much less disagreement between him and Lerner than he suggests.
I. Boettke's Critique of Formalism
Boettke (1997) writes that in describing economic behavior in mathematical language formalists drained the real world of its complexity. Hence formalism swept away "historical work on the complex web of inst~itutions that undergird capitalist dynamics" (p. 21 Machlup (1978, p. 145) called a sense of "Ahaness."
Though philosophers of science and methodologists argue about the choice b'etween these criteria, most of us pay some attention to both, though we differ in the relative weight we give them. Even if a theory seems to explain well, in the sense of linking a particular phenomenon srnoothly to our prior beliefs, we do not accept it if its predic1:ions are consistently falsified.
Conversely, we usually reject as a mere spurious correlation a hypothesis that predicts well, but "makes no sense." Under neither criterion do we reject a theory merely because it abstracts.
One might perhaps respond that some abstractions are so obviously wrong that even without knowing how well a theory based on them predicts or explains, we can say with confidence that this theory must be wrong. But even though there are instances where this is correct (e.g. ab,stracting from self-interested behavior and assuming firms arje driven only by altruistic motives) are there many such cases in economics? Boettke is able to say yes, only because he takes it as a given in his essay that Austrian theory is correct. Hence, if formalist economics ignores some vari-able that play a significant role in Austrian theory the formalist. theory must be wrong. But why assume a priori that Austrian theory is correct?
However, a more nuanced ver,sion of Boettke l s criticism of the formalists' abstractions is correct. This is that often mathematical modeling not only requires more abstraction than verbal an.alysis, but also that :it seems harder to be mindful of some of the abstract~ions that have been made when we read a mathematical analysis, than when we read a verbal analysis (see Keynes, 1936, pp. 297-98 One can therefore justify some formalist economics on l'art pour l'art grounds because, like any other piece of rigorous and elegant reasoning, it provldes intellectual satisfaction. If we support research in pure mathematics and in art history for the "glory of mankind," we should also support some research in formalist economics. Moreover, some formalist models can be justified, not as the end product of economic analysis, but as an intermediate product. Allan Gibbard and Hal Varian (1978) have argued that many economic models are "caricature" models, intended to highlight some particular feature of the economic process, even though this gives a distorted picture of the economy. Others can then combine the lessons learned from such caricature models to build a more baianced model of the economy.
The trouble is that putting these caricature models together into a realistic description of the economy seems less attractive or more difficult than building additional caricature models, so that too little of the former and too much of the latter gets done.
The questioTn is therefore :not whether some formalist economics should be done, but how much. The glib answer that some economists give, let the market decide, will not do. The This narrow focus has prov13d fruitful. Normal-science research is how a ma.ture field, which economics has become by now, makes its day-to-day advances. More generally, few makstream economists are likely to become converts to Austrian economics in its entirety, but more might take specific Austrian ideas seriously if these were shown to be re:levant to their specific concerns, and were reformulated in way compatible with mainstream methodolooical criteria.
Granted that Austrian economics is built on philosophical foundations that differ sha.rply from those of mainstream economics, it would "sell" better if it were sold separately.
Similarly, a more politically neutral version might find additional markets. Since Austrians are in the distinct minority it is up to them to build the needed bridges.
Austrians may, of course, object that they want to do more than bring about a few changes in mainstream economics. But aiming at an attainable goal is better than aiming at one that is out of reach. Moreover, a s'eries of small changes may add up to a large change. One should not ex.aggerate the incompatibility of paradigms. Austrian economi.cs n.eeds fewer generals making grand plans, and more privates fighting the war a hill at a time. For other problems with modeling see Mayer (1996) .
Those who criticized the use of mathematics in economics made a bad case by arguing that it is of little use. There is by now massive evidence to the contrary. They should have made their c'ase, not against the use of mathematics, but against the over-emphasis on mathematics, and made their case on two grounds. One is McCloskey's (1985) charge that the values appropriate for a mathematics department threaten to overwhelm economics, and the other is opportunity cost. Obviously, other things being equal, an economist who knows more mathematics is better equipped to do research than one who knows less. But other things are not equal. The more time students spend learning mathematics, the less time they have available to learn economics, though, admittedly the shift from language requirements to a math. requirement was clearly beneficial. Similarly, given the amount of time economists spend on research, and given the a.vailable space in journals and books, the number of hours an economist spends on a paper is fixed. The more of this time is spen.t polishing the mathematics, the less time is available for ch.ecking the correctness of the analysis in other ways.
In Bergamo (Italy) I saw just. below the dome of a church a fresco that can be seen -and seen only faintly -from the top of a certain towers. Presumably it was painted "for the glory of God", not for people's enj~oyment or instruction. One can justify some papers in Econometrics that almost nobody can read in the same way. Given how few readers even most not very technical papers in economic journals have, and how unlikely it is that they will have any influence on policy or economists' thinking, one might argue that most of them are best justified as "for the glory of God or mankind."
One might, however, object that in the social sciences knowledge is so preca.rious that one should limit as much as one reasonably can thl3se propositions that are privileges as uncontroversial. Many ideological propositions would then nor qualify for the core.
But that is not always so. In some situations it is reasonable to hold two conf:Licti.ng views (see Foley, 1979) .
Here is a concrete ex'ample. Phillip Cagan (1965) found that being covered by a corporate pension scheme induces households to save more on their own. This implies an increasing marginal utility of wealth, and therefore conflicts with the well established belief that margfinal utility decreases as one obtains more. I t~herefore did not accept Caganrs findings, though I could find no fault with his analysis. Subsequently, when Cagan's data were re-analyzed, it turned out that they were wrong.
Boettke (1997, p . 30) recognizes this when he writes that: "Equilibrium theorizing :is not be rejected, according to Hayek, but its real purpose must be constantly kept in mind. Formal modeling can be a very good servant, but a poor master." However, the general imp:ress:~on that Boettke gives is of a strong condemnation of ecpillbrium theory.
